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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW: TORT
DEVELOPMENTS
Kenneth Kandaras*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991 and 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court decided a number
of cases in the following areas of tort law: product liability, attorney
malpractice, Structural Work Act claims, destruction of evidence of
a tort, computation of wrongful death damages, retaliatory discharge,
liability for land conditions, damages for loss of society, the effect
of plaintiff's contributory negligence in willful and wanton cases,
contribution, expert certification of healing art malpractice claims,
statutes of limitation and repose, and immunities. This article briefly
summarizes the most important cases and, where appropriate, offers
editorial comment upon the decision and the opinions rendered
therein.
II.

PRODUCT LIABILITY: ABANDONMENT OF NATURALFOREIGN SUBSTANCE RULE

The court in Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc.' considered the fundamental question of who should bear the risk for injuries sustained
by ingesting food that contains "natural" but unwanted substancesmanufacturers or consumers. Before Jackson, manufacturers could
be liable for foreign substances in food but not for ones natural to
the food product. Under that rule, for example, a consumer injured
while eating a turkey casserole could sue if the offending substance
was a ball-bearing but not if it was a turkey bone. 2 The distinction
between "natural-foreign" substances was based on the assumption
that consumers know that food makers may not be able to remove
all natural substances from the raw food product. Thus, consumers
were on notice to use care to avoid injury from unwanted natural
substances. Conversely, because consumers had no reasonable expec* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. I appreciate the helpful research efforts
and comments of senior law student Daniel R. Groth, Jr.
1. 147 I11.2d 408, 589 N.E.2d 547 (1992).
2. Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E. 612 (2d Dist. 1944).
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tation of ball-bearings and the like in their food, food makers had
no protection for foreign substances.
In Jackson, the plaintiff broke a tooth on a pecan shell when
she bit into a piece of defendant's candy. Plaintiff sued on theories
of breach of implied warranty and strict liability. Though the wrapper
stated that the candy contained nuts, there was no suggestion that it
possibly contained shells. However, there was no evidence that the
defendant knew the candy contained shells. Indeed, the record supports the conclusion that the defendant used due care to remove the
shells during the manufacturing process.
The trial court, finding the shell a nafural substance and invoking
the natural-foreign rule, granted the defendant summary judgment.
On review, the supreme court concluded that no reasons exist to
exempt food makers from liability for injuries caused by natural
substances. The court rejected the defendant's underlying theory that
food makers should not be liable for injuries caused by natural
substances. Though presented in a variety of ways, 3 the defendant's
central argument was that liability for natural ingredient-related
injuries should not exist unless the manufacturer fails to use due
care to eliminate the unwanted natural substance. Defendant argued
that because no effective process exists to totally eliminate unwanted
natural substances, abandonment of the natural substance rule requires the manufacturer to do that which is economically unfeasible
to do. Rather than abandon the rule, the defendant invited the court
to adopt a rule that shifts the burden of proof on due care to the
food maker, thus permitting the manufacturer to avoid liability if it
proves that it used reasonable steps to eliminate unwanted natural

substances .4
The court rejected these arguments and concluded that there is
no evidence to show that consumers, rather than manufacturers, are

3. In addition to arguments discussed in the text, defendant argued: that food products
such as those produced by Nestle have a high social value and should be judged under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. K (1965), as unavoidably unsafe products; and
that, unlike other product makers, food manufacturers do not create the risks attendant to
natural ingredients, rather those risks are inherent in food processing. The court rejected these
arguments concluding that Nestle's candies did not rank high in social value and that Nestle,
as a processor of food, has the opportunity to eliminate unwanted natural ingredients.
Additionally, even if the defendant's products were deemed unavoidably unsafe, the defendant
failed to adequately warn consumers of the likely risks associated with the product's use.
Jackson, 147 Ill. 2d at 418, 589 N.E.2d at 552.
4. The defendant urged the court to adopt the Louisiana rule which premises liability
upon the food maker's failure to prove due care in the elimination of natural substances. Id.
at 417, 589 N.E.2d at 552.
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in a better position to guard against the risks of natural substances.
On the contrary, since manufacturers are in a better position to
know when their products contain unwanted natural substances, the
court concluded that the manufacturers are better positioned to
shoulder the risk. However, the court noted that liability still focuses
upon consumer expectations. It framed the appropriate test as being:
"Would a reasonable consumer expect that a given product might
contain the substance or matter causing a particular injury?'" Consequently, manufacturers have no liability when consumers on their
own would ordinarily know of the risk or when manufacturers
adequately warn their product consumers of the possible presence of
unwanted natural substances. 6 The new rule eliminates the blanket
protection for natural substances and makes their presence in a
product merely one factor in determining whether the reasonable
consumer might expect to find it in the product. Put into perspective,
the food maker may yet avoid liability for the turkey bone-casserole,
but that result will follow an analysis of the consumer's expectation-

5. Id. at 413-14, 589 N.E.2d at 550.
6. The majority and the dissent (authored by Justice Heiple) seem never to join issue.
Though the majority, in part, cast its decision in terms of advancing technologies which permit
food makers to eliminate unwanted substances, the absence of any serious discussion about
the technologies available in the nut-processing industry leads to the conclusion that the court's
opinion is more appropriately founded on the notion that, regardless of the food maker's due
care, notice to consumers of the dangers inherent in the product is the critical necessity. Justice
Heiple's dissent focused on the economic and technological dimension of the case. He asserted
that food makers can not remove all natural substances in a cost-effective manner. Thus,
imposing liability upon the food maker in this situation is unfair and potentially ruinous for
the defendant and other product makers. Unfortunately, the dissent also lacks any serious
discussion of the economics and technology of defendant's industry. Further, the dissent dealt
in only summary fashion with the troublesome issues of what food products are subject to
the rule and how notice will be imparted to the consumer. Thus, the dissent raises obliquely
such questions as: Do the notice requirements apply only to packaged foods sold in retail
markets (e.g., products that remain in the same condition as when sold by the food maker)?
Does the rule require notice to consumers buying prepared foods from restaurants or street
vendors? Also left unexplored is the question of whether the food maker gives appropriate
notice by notifying intermediate food distributors; a notion akin to the learned intermediary
in the pharmaceutical context. Additionally, neither the majority nor the dissent considered
the threshold question of whether food makers can effectively communicate notice of the
dangers to product consumers. One might wonder whether notice concerning a food product
actually influences consumer behavior. Unfortunately, this proposition was not evident in
either opinion. Thus, Nestle-Beich is not built firmly upon the theory that the defendant should
use more cost effective technologies, nor on a studied determination that money put into more
notice will return the requisite "bang for the buck." In the end, all that may be said about
the decision is that it is premised upon the general notion that a warning on package containers
is better than no notice to the consumers, even if the court is unaware of the effectiveness of
the warning.
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and not the mere characterization of the offending object.
III.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE: ECONOMIC
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE

In a case that caused considerable controversy, the Illinois Supreme
Court in Collins v. Reynard held, on rehearing, that clients may sue
attorneys in tort and seek damages for economic loss. In Collins,
the plaintiff contended that she suffered a loss when her attorney
failed to protect a security interest in certain property that she sold.
Though there was a question as to the proper characterization of the
plaintiff's loss, the court treated it as economic in nature. Thus, the
case implicated the Moorman Doctrine, a rule which generally limits
recovery of economic damages to contract actions-not tort. 8
The court's initial opinion, since withdrawn, drew a close parallel
between architectural and attorney malpractice actions. It concluded
that, as in the case of architects, 9 Moorman precluded recovery in
tort of economic losses caused by attorney malpractice. On rehearing,
however, the court conceded that its initial decision was contrary to
well-settled law concerning attorney malpractice and reversed its
position. The court stated that despite the logic of Moorman, it
would be inappropriate to alter well-settled law. 10
Collins leaves the field of professional malpractice in some
doubt. Arguments against recovery of economic damages in professional malpractice settings may be quite thin. Whether they are
advanced as a bar to tort recovery under the Moorman Doctrine or
as a limitation on contract damages, a bar to economic damages in
many instances frustrates the client's reasonable expectation of professional responsibility. It seems quite sensible for clients to expect
professionals to achieve those reasonable objectives that both the
professional and client have agreed upon, and for professionals to
advise clients on the various options and potential problems that
might be encountered in certain courses of action. Indeed, the very
act of employing a professional underscores, in most cases, the notion
that the client seeks to rely upon the special expertise of the professional. Thus, it is unremarkable that the plaintiff in Collins sought
7. 154 Ill. 2d 48, 607 N.E.2d 1185 (1992).

8. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 135 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
9. 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 136
Ill. 2d 302, 555 N.E.2d 346 (1990).
10. Collins, 154 II1. 2d at 50, 607 N.E.2d at 1186.
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consequential damages when the attorney allegedly advised her to
sign a contract not containing the security interest she had sought,
and failed to advise her to secure a financing statement. Her damage
request was thus tailored to the risk and loss entailed in the attorney's
alleged negligence. Collins ultimately recognized that this has been
the law in attorney malpractice.
Collins does not attempt to rehash the issue of architectural
malpractice" or question whether the policy considerations at play
in attorney malpractice support a rethinking of the architectural
malpractice rule. Nor does it explain why, aside from stare decisis,
attorney malpractice should be treated in a manner different from
other forms of professional malpractice. There is little doubt that
Collins will spawn renewed arguments urging parity between legal
and other forms of professional malpractice. And, by and large, the
relationship appear in analogous
factors present in the attorney-client
12
relationships.
form in other
IV.

STRUCTURAL WORK ACT

Scope of the Act: Stability of the Structure

A.

In American National Bank v. National Advertising,13 the court
considered the fundamental question of whether the Structural Work
Act 14 is limited to the stability of work structures or whether it
extends worker protection to worksite ambient hazards. In American,

11.

This issue was decided in Lincoln Park, 136 Il. 2d 302, 555 N.E.2d 346.
12. The distinction between attorneys and other professionals may yet be justified. First,
in non-attorney settings, clients may have insurance to cover economic losses associated with
professional negligence (i.e., business interruption insurance in the event of architectural
malpractice); second, clients in these contexts may be better educated concerning their need to
negotiate the issue of economic risks with the professional service provider. (Indeed, oftentimes
attorneys are used to negotiate the professional services contract.) The attorney-client setting
is generally quite different. Clients rarely insure against their attorneys' negligence. Further,
clients generally hire attorneys to represent them in their dealings with third persons. Applying
the Moorman Doctrine to attorneys would lead to the anomalous result that clients would
need to hire contract attorneys to help them retain an attorney. After all, by what other means
could clients effectively negotiate the issue of economic losses with their attorneys, but by
hiring attorneys to represent them. Thus, the up-shot of Collins is that the attorney must
shoulder the risk of economic loss unless the attorney effectively negates the obligation by
contract. See ILL. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.8 (f): "A lawyer shall not make an agreement with
a client prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to the client unless such an agreement is
permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement."
13. 149 Ill. 2d 14, 594 N.E.2d 313 (1992).
60-69 (1991), 740 ILCS 150/1-/9 (1992).
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48,
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the plaintiff's decedent died when he stepped along a walkway on
the defendant's billboard and touched a high-voltage power line.
Plaintiff alleged that the Structural Work Act (Act) protects a worker
from placement of a structural device in such a manner as to bring
him unreasonably close to the power line. The supreme court concluded, however, that the Act was intended only to ensure that
structures provide stable support for workers, and not necessarily a
15
hazard-free worksite.
The court, however, stated that the defendant might be liable
on an alternate theory, one that bases liability upon the lessee's duty
of care to an invitee on the premises. The court reiterated its adoption
of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that a possessor
of land is liable for physical injuries caused by certain conditions
found on the premises.' 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the
facts supported a colorable claim that the defendant knew of the
dangers associated with its billboard walkway; that the defendant
knew that an invitee may not appreciate the dangers; and, that the
defendant failed to take reasonable steps to make the property
reasonably safe or to inform the invitee of the dangers. Thus, injuries
resulting from ambient hazards are not covered by the Act, but may
17
come within the duty owed to an invitee on the land.

15. American, 149 Ill. 2d at 25, 594 N.E.2d at 318.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).

17. American, 149 Ill. 2d at 27, 594 N.E.2d at 319. In his dissent, Justice Bilandic
contended that the majority's opinion is contrary to the plain meaning and intent of the Act.
Referring to the Act, he noted that a structure should be "placed . .. as to give proper and
adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged
thereon." Id. at 32, 594 N.E.2d at 321 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (quoting 1L1. REV. STAT. ch.
48, 60, 740 ILCS 150/1). Thus, from his perspective, the Act literally requires placement of
the structure in a manner that protects the worker's safety. The American decision, he
contended, exposes employees to dangerous conditions which they have no right to control or
alter. Id. at 33, 594 N.E.2d at 322 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
Justice Bilandic considered the majority's points in turn. He disputed the majority's view
of the relevant legislative intent. First, he observed that the Act was not merely intended to
ensure that workers and objects would not fall from the structure. Id. at 32, 594 N.E.2d at
321 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). He noted that the legislature pointedly dealt with such eventualities
in other portions of the Act. Consequently, structural support was not the focus of the entire
Act. Second, the Act was not merely meant to give workers a remedy where none previously
existed. Id. at 33, 594 N.E.2d at 322 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Noting that many workers are
powerless to refuse to work in dangerous settings, he contended that the Act was designed to
protect workers by placing the onus for safety on those who control the worksite and insist
that the work be done. Further, American may dilute worker safety by inviting employers to
avoid premises liability by arguing the open and obviousness of the danger, an argument raised
in the principal case. Id. at 35, 594 N.E.2d at 322 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Ultimately, he
feared that structures now may be erected close to power lines, expressways, or under other
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B.

Spouse's Action for Loss of Consortium

In Harvel v. City of Johnston City, 8 the court held that, under
Section 9 of the Act, 9 the spouse of a non-fatally injured worker
may maintain an action for loss of consortium. At issue in the case
was whether a spouse was an "injured party" within the meaning
of Section 9. Because the Act did not specifically address the matter,
it fell to the court to interpret the statute's meaning. In an opinion
that searchingly reviewed the history of Section 9, and various
antecedent worker statutes, the court concluded that recognition of
a cause of action for loss of consortium would ensure a greater
measure of recovery for losses proximately related to the defendant's
conduct and would create a powerful disincentive to the willful
violation of the Act. Furthermore, recognizing that courts have
permitted such claims arising from fatal injuries, 20 extension of the
right to non-fatal mishaps would bring needed harmony to this area
21
of the law.
V.

DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

The destruction of documents or objects that are likely to be
used as evidence in litigation is a problematic concern. Courts have
struggled with competing arguments that individuals have a right to
systematically destroy unnecessary documents and, on the other hand,
that the destruction of these documents or objects may adversely
affect the ability to sue or defend claims. Some courts have addressed
the matter in the context of discovery sanctions. 22 Others have
considered whether document destruction itself might give rise to a
distinct cause of action for damages when absence of the document

structures where objects may fall on the worker. Thus, he asserted that a stable work platform
is not the sole concern of the worker, nor was it that of the legislature when it passed the
Act.
18. 146 Ill. 2d 277, 586 N.E.2d 1217 (1992).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 69, 740 ILCS 150/9.
20. See Pickett v. Yellow Cab Co., 182 Ill. App. 3d 62, 537 N.E.2d 933 (1st Dist. 1982)
(claim allowed in instance when worker died of his injuries).
21. Harvel, 146 I1. 2d at 291, 586 N.E.2d at 1223. Chief Justice Miller and Justice Heiple,
however, in separate dissents, contended that Harvel takes liberty with the Act's silence on
the question and they would defer to the legislature's authority in matters which would so
greatly increase the liability under the Act. 146 Ill. 2d at 300, 586 N.E.2d at 1228 (Miller,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 305, 586 N.E.2d at 1230 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
22. See Robert G. JOHNSTON & KENNETH KANDARAs., DISCOVERY IN ILLINOIS: FEDERAL AND
STATE PRACTICE 178-82 (1985).
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precludes a party from sustaining its original action. 23 In one narrow

instance, the supreme court has now recognized that pre-litigation
destruction of certain documents is an actionable wrong.
24

Premised on the duty found in the X-Ray Retention Act (Act),
the court in Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur 5 held that

hospitals may be sued for damages proximately related to their failure
to retain x-rays needed by litigants to prove their malpractice claims.

The plaintiff in Rodgers contended that his malpractice actions
against two physicians were undermined as a result of the hospital's
failure to retain various x-rays containing evidence against the physicians. 26 The court noted that the Act specifically requires hospitals
to keep x-rays for possible or pending litigation and concluded that
the legislature impliedly intended a cause of action against the hospital

27
for violation of the Act.
The Act itself plainly states that hospitals which produce x-rays
must keep them for an initial five year period.28 Finding that the
plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the Act and that an implied

cause of action was a necessary measure to provide an adequate
remedy for violation of the Act, the court recognized the plaintiff's
right to sue the hospital for its failure to comply with the Act. The
court noted, however, that liability is not established by a simple

showing that the x-rays were not retained. Rather, plaintiff must
prove that the violation of the Act was the proximate cause of his
29
inability to maintain an action against the health care provider.
Further, it left for future case development the question of whether
liability was based upon strict liability or negligence, and whether
violation of the Act was negligence per se or merely a prima facie
showing of negligence.

23. See, e.g., Petrick v. Monarch Printing Corp. 150 I11.App. 3d 248, 501 N.E.2d 1312
(1st Dist. 1986); Fox v. Cohen, 84 I11. App. 3d 744, 406 N.E.2d 178 (1st Dist. 1980).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/,,
157-11 (1991), 210 ILCS 90/1 (1992).
25. 149 Il. 2d 302, 597 N.E.2d 616 (1992).
26. Id. at 305, 597 N.E.2d at 618. Plaintiff sued two physicians: one an obstetrician, the
other a radiologist. The jury found the obstetrician liable for $1.2 million, and found the
radiologist not liable. The obstetrician appealed and the parties later settled the claim for
$800,000. Plaintiff contended in the action against the hospital that the radiologist would have
been found jointly liable but for the absence of the x-rays. Thus, plaintiff sought $400,000
from the hospital, that being the difference between the $1.2 million full recovery he would
have received and the $800,000 settlement. Id. at 305-07, 597 N.E.2d at 618-19.
27. The court took care to note that the Act's official title is "An Act concerning the
retention for use in litigation of x-ray or roentgen films of the human anatomy." Id. at 307,
597 N.E.2d at 619.
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. li1/2, 1157-11, 210 ILCS 90/1.
29. Rodgers, 149 111.2d at 309-10, 597 N.E.2d at 620.
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Rodgers leaves an important question open, that is, whether a
cause of action exists against a party who is not under a statutory
mandate to retain documents but who knows or is substantially
certain that the documents the party destroys would be needed by a
potential adversary in litigation. For example, would a claim exist
against one given actual pre-litigation notice that documents in his
possession will later be sought for trial? Clearly, the destruction of
documents in this instance would frustrate the litigant's case and
deprive the court of valuable evidence needed to ascertain the truth.
How the supreme court will respond to such a claim is unclear.
Obviously, Rodgers must be read as a decision that effectuates the
legislature's desire to protect the litigation options of the patient.
However, is the judiciary's overarching interest in the truthseeking
process deserving of less protection? At a minimum, the Rodgers
decision will make it extremely difficult for the court to deny a cause
30
of action for the intentional destruction of documents.
VI.

WRONGFUL DEATH

In Seef v. Sutkus, 31 the court considered whether a parent has
the right to recover damages for loss of society of a stillborn but
thirty-eight week-old viable fetus. Prior to Seef, lower courts had
differed on the issue. Opposition to the right rested on the central
argument that the right to damages for loss of society depended
upon the existence of a relationship of mutual love and affection.
Elaborating on the theory, it was argued that damages could not be
predicated merely on the love and affection that the parents might
have for the child. A damage award must be calculated upon the
established parent-child track record, one in which the jury could
assess the degree of estrangement, if any, within the relationship.
Thus, the defendant in Seef argued that because the unborn child
had not established a relationship with his parents, an award of
damages under these circumstances would be hopelessly speculative-

30. Cf. American Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc., 223 Ill. App. 3d 624,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2d Dist, 1992). In American Family, plaintiff examined and then destroyed
a damaged auto before the defendant was given an opportunity to examine the auto. Although
the rules do not specifically address the need to preserve documents or tangible objects in
advance of a discovery request, the court concluded that the trial court exercised appropriate
discretion when it precluded the plaintiff from introducing at trial any evidence concerning
the condition of the auto. The court concluded that a party has no right to destroy an object
intentionally and thus deny an opponent the opportunity to examine the object independently.
31. 145 I1. 2d 336, 583 N.E.2d 510 (1991).
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the jury and defendant being deprived of evidence that might show
an estrangement between parents and child.
32
The court concluded in Seef that the Wrongful Death Act (Act)
and prior case law support the conclusion that parents may maintain
an action for loss of society of an unborn but viable fetus. Thus,
the court rejected the reasoning in Hunt v. ChettrP1 that the cause
of action depended upon a showing that a relationship of mutual
love and affection existed between the parents and child. Further, it
was noted that the Act specifically provides that an unborn fetus is
considered a person within the meaning of the Act.14 Furthermore,
it was noted that existing case law permits parents to maintain such
an action for the loss of a minor or infant child. By comparison,
the loss of a viable fetus, the court reasoned, was no less deserving
than the loss of an infant child. The court also dismissed defendant's
objection that evidence would be lacking as to estrangement noting
with irony that defendant's misconduct was precisely that which was
alleged to have denied the child's life and, consequently, the child's
opportunity to develop a loving (or estranged) relationship with his
parents. In conclusion, the court stated "that a rebuttable presumption for loss of society exists for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child." 35
VII.

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

The court's decision in Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,36 effectively bars
retaliatory discharge claims by attorneys. The attorney in Balla
claimed his employment responsibilities with his corporate employer
were both legal and non-legal in nature. He further claimed that his
firing occurred when in his non-legal role he informed the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that his corporate
employer planned to sell a medical device that would endanger the
user's life.37 Thus, the plaintiff sought to bring himself within the
tort of retaliatory discharge by asserting that his employer could not
discharge him solely because he acted to vindicate an important social
interest.

32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70,
.01-2.2 (1991), 740 ILCS 180/0.01-/2.2 (1992).
33. 158 Ill. App. 3d 76, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (5th Dist. 1987).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2.2, 740 ILCS 180/2.2.
35. See, 145 Ill. 2d at 339, 583 N.E.2d at 512.
36. 145 I11.2d 492, 584 N.E.2d 104 (1991).
37. Id. at 496, 584 N.E.2d at 106. The FDA later seized the product and declared it
adulterated under the federal laws. Id. at 497, 584 N.E.2d at 106.
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In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the supreme court reasoned
that the tort of retaliatory discharge is designed to protect employees
who voluntarily pursue the public good. Thus, individuals under no
compulsion to act should not fear for their job because they chose
to act consistent with important public policies.3" However, as to the
plaintiff/attorney, the court found that he acted in his legal role
when he informed the FDA of the possible dangers associated with
the devices. Consequently, a tort claim was unnecessary to protect
the public good because as an attorney he had a duty to inform the
FDA of client conduct that threatened others with death or serious
bodily harm.3 9 Compliance with ethical rules, the court held, is an
attorney's inherent obligation. Thus, dismissal for honoring one's
4
ethical obligations is simply an expected cost of the profession. 0
The Balla opinion may go beyond a mere honoring of ethical
obligations. In-house counsel may function in many instances in nonlegal capacities. If an attorney/executive is fired for conduct which
is wholly within the non-legal domain and no ethical obligation is
implicated, would an action for retaliatory discharge lie? Though it
purports not to deal with the matter, the court's opinion indicates
that in-house attorneys may in all instances be precluded from such
a claim. The court stated that retaliatory discharge suits by in-house
counsel would seriously jeopardize the attorney-client relationship.4 1
Clients, said the court, may be reluctant to speak freely with counsel
42
on legal and non-legal matters for fear of retaliatory discharge suits.
Thus, the court strongly intimated that the tort should not be
extended to attorneys in any circumstances because of its threatened
impact upon the attorney-client relationship.
VIII.

LAND CONDITIONS

A landowner may take reasonable precautions to protect his
land from incursions by motor vehicles. An owner's knowledge that
individuals may leave the roadway and intrude on the land does not

38. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
39. ILL. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.6(b).
40. The Illinois Supreme Court followed the lead of the appellate court in Herbster v,
North American Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (2d Dist.
1986) which similarly barred an attorney's claim. Justice Freeman dissented, however, concluding that the court gives safe harbor to scoundrels and overlooks the economic and
professional consequences that the decision asks attorneys to bear. Balia, 145 Ill. 2d at 510,
584 N.E.2d at 113 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
41. Balia, 145 Ill. 2d at 502, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
42. Id. at 502-03, 584 N.E.2d at 109.

HeinOnline -- 17 S. Ill. U. L. J. 971 1992-1993

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

(Vol. 17

create a duty to avoid fencing one's property. Thus, in Hutchings v.
Bauer,43 the court held that a landowner was not liable for injuries
incurred when a motorcyclist struck a grass obscured fence erected
approximately 15 to 20 feet within the property line. Though the
owner was aware of more than 50 instances when motorists traveled
upon his land, the court concluded that the fence was a reasonable
means to insure the owner's property right.
In a similar vein, the court addressed the liability of utility
companies for their placement of poles along roadways. In Gouge
v. Central Illinois Public Service,44 the court held that utility companies have a duty to properly place and guy their utilities poles,
but the duty does not extend to motorists who unreasonably depart
from the roadway. The court, referring to Section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stated that the duty owed depends upon
the ability to foresee the motorist's deviation from the ordinary
course of travel. Consequently, the plaintiff, who lost control of his
car and struck a utility pole located 15 feet off the pavement, did
not state a cause of action for either the negligent placement or
negligent guying of the pole because his departure from the pavement
was not reasonably foreseeable. In an otherwise unexceptional case,
the court in Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos.45 held that the City of
Chicago building code as it pertains to the construction of stairwells
and the placement of handrails is a public safety provision. Violation
of the code, the court stated, constitutes a prima facie showing of
negligence.
IX.

DAMAGES: LOSS OF SOCIETY

In Drews v. Gobel Freight Lines, Inc., 46 the court held that
damages for loss of society are not economic damages which must
be reduced to present day cash value. Among other damages, the
plaintiff in Drews recovered approximately $7,000,000 for loss of
society for the surviving spouse and children. 47 The trial court rejected
the defendant's argument that as a form of pecuniary award loss of

43. 149 Ill. 2d 568, 599 N.E.2d 934 (1992).
44. 144 111.2d 535, 582 N.E.2d 108 (1991).
45. 144 Ill. 2d 425, 581 N.E.2d 656 (1991).
46. 144 111.2d 84, 578 N.E.2d 970 (1992).
47. The majority opinion failed to specify the exact amount awarded, and the dissent
merely stated "that it is apparent that the bulk of the award, perhaps as much as $7 million,
was for loss of society." Id. at 106, 578 N.E.2d at 980.
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society should be discounted to present value. Thus, the trial court
entered judgment for the full amount of the verdict.
On appeal, the supreme court agreed. First, the court reviewed
the history of cases deciding the issue and concluded that Illinois
courts had consistently viewed loss of society, like pain and suffering,
to be a type of injury recoverable in a lump sum payment, and one
not susceptible to apportionment over the recipient's projected lifetime. Second, the court concluded that such damages are at best an
estimate by the jury of the recipient's projected loss. In this regard,
the court observed that the jury lacks any set of criteria for determining an apportioned or year-by-year determination of loss. The
court compared loss of society to lost future earnings, a type of
damage that is reduced to present cash value. It observed that, unlike
recovery for future earnings which can be determined by assessing
past earnings and future potential, the jury lacks any firm basis for
an arithmetically certain finding and could not apportion plaintiff's
loss of society.
This last point is central to the decision. The court seemed
particularly taken by the lack of any objective basis for the determination of present day value. For example, how should the jury
determine the loss that a spouse or child will feel at different times
in their lifetime? Will they feel a differing sense of loss at different
stages of their lives? At best, the jury must make an intelligent guess
about matters which are highly speculative.
The Drews decision may well have identified very serious difficulties in changing the lump-sum rule of recovery, but it leaves
important policy considerations unaddressed. It is important to note
that the defendant did not question the legality of awards for loss
of society. The defendant did not challenge the award as being so
utterly unguided that it was unconstitutional, nor did the defendant
question the instructions given to the jury to determine the factors
to be considered. The only issue raised was whether the amount that
compensated plaintiffs for a lifetime of loss should be reduced to
present cash value. In other words, the defendant questioned whether
the plaintiffs were entitled to the time value of the money applicable
to losses that would be felt in the future. The court's rationale for
refusing a present cash value determination is not compelling. Having
found that loss of society awards are not subject to arithmetic
certainty and are highly speculative, the court apparently concluded
that no effort should be taken to determine on a principled basis
whether the plaintiff or defendant should be given the benefit of the
time value of the money. Of course, one might question whether
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there is a principled basis to decide in favor of either party. Where
the choice is between two bad rules, selection of one may not be
inherently unfair. But, there may be reasons not announced in the
opinion which justify the rule. First, loss of society awards may
function here as a form of punishment exacted from the defendant
for depriving the plaintiffs of a most valued relationship. An exaggerated dollar recovery (if indeed it is) would in this sense be a lesser
form of punitive damages. Second, despite instructions to the contrary, the court may believe that juries in many instances already
reduce such awards by concluding that the most grievous loss will
be felt in the earliest years. Therefore, any reduction would only cut
into the amount that the jury already views as fairly apportioning
the loss over time. Thus, perhaps the Drews decision exacts a
measured and appropriately high recovery for loss of society. But,
these are matters of speculation. One might hope that the court
would articulate a rationale for the Drews rule that addresses the
seriousness of the defendant's argument.
X. NEGLIGENCE: PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IN ACTIONS BASED UPON WILLFUL AND
WANTON MISCONDUCT
The effect of plaintiff's contributory fault upon the right to recover
4
damages has undergone considerable chhnge since Alvis v. Ribar. 1
Alvis abandoned Illinois' adherence to a rule that barred recovery in
negligence when the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Instead,
the supreme court adopted a rule of comparative negligence. Subsequently, statutory changes altered the rule to one of modified comparative negligence, barring recovery if the plaintiff's negligence
exceeds 50% of the cumulative fault. 49 In the backdrop of this debate
is the question of whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars
or reduces his recovery in an action premised on the defendant's
willful and wanton misconduct.
Before Alvis, Illinois followed the common law rule that a
plaintiff's recovery would be undiminished as against a wrongdoer
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. The thought behind the
rule is that, as between two wrongdoers, the best result is to make
the defendant fully liable for his more socially deviant behavior.
However, with the advent of modified comparative negligence, the

48. 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1116 (1991), 735 ILCS 5/2-1116 (1992).
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supreme court still needed to consider whether the legislature intended
to place all forms of fault based liability on a comparative basis.
The supreme court addressed this matter in Burke v. Rothschild's
Liquor Mart. 0
In Burke, the plaintiff was initially injured and knocked unconscious in a fracas with defendant Rothschild's employees. 5 The
defendant police officers later arrived and reportedly dragged and
kicked the plaintiff while placing him in a paddy wagon. In a final
toll of injuries the plaintiff sustained irreversible damage to his spinal
cord and was rendered a quadriplegic. The case was submitted to
the jury based upon different theories of liability. The plaintiff sought
recovery against Rothschild's based on negligence. The court instructed the jury that it could reduce plaintiff's recovery if it found
the plaintiff contributorily negligent. As against the police officers,
the plaintiff sought recovery based upon willful and wanton misconduct. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent towards the police officers and they could not
reduce plaintiff's recovery. 2 The jury found Rothschild's liable and
plaintiff contributorily negligent, and calculated damages accordingly.
As to the police officers, the jury, consistent with the court's instructions, found them liable for the full extent of plaintiff's injuries.
Thereafter, the police officers appealed, contending that the plaintiff's contributory negligence should be used to reduce the damages
awarded against them.
The supreme court held that neither history. nor legislative reform
supported the defendants' argument that, as government officers,
their liability for willful and wanton misconduct should be reduced
by the extent of plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court reviewed the post-Alvis reforms and concluded that the legislature
sought to modify only those cases in which liability was premised
upon negligence or strict liability. The court also noted that in passing
the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immu-

50. 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992).
51. The extent of the injuries inflicted by the Rothschild employees is unclear. Plaintiff
contended that he could not move his arms and legs after his engagement with them. Id. at
434, 593 N.E.2d at 524.
52. The supreme court found the record unclear with respect to the basis for the trial
court's ruling. Id. at 439-40, 593 N.E.2d at 526. The record supported two alternatives: that
the evidence on contributory negligence was wanting and plaintiff was entitled to a directed
verdict on the issue, or that contributory negligence as a matter of law is irrelevant in an
action premised upon willful and wanton misconduct.
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nity Act," the legislature did not clearly seek to dilute liability for
conduct as egregious as the defendants' conduct. Finally, the court
found that barring a reduction of plaintiff's damages would serve as
4
a needed deterrence to defendants' opprobrious conduct.
XI.
A.

CONTRIBUTION

Vicarious Liability-Settlement By Principal and/or Agent

The court in American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus
Cuneo-CabriniMedical Center" addressed several longstanding issues
surrounding the principal's vicarious liability for an agent's negligence, and the rights of the principal and agent in light of their
independent settlement of claims asserted by the original plaintiff.
In American, the plaintiff sued a medical center on a theory of
vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees. Thereafter, the
medical center filed a third party action against the employees alleging
a right to contribution in the amount of 100% of plaintiff's claim
or, alternatively, a right to implied indemnity that would similarly
entitle the defendant to 100% recovery of any damages paid to the
plaintiff. The employees settled with the plaintiff and the trial court
dismissed the medical center's third party action. The trial court
concluded that the Contribution Act (Act)56 barred both of the
medical center's claims; first, because the Act purportedly abolished
implied indemnity; and second, because under the Act the parties'
good faith settlement cut-off the employees' liability for contribu57
tion.
The supreme court reversed and held that the Act did not abolish
the principal's right to indemnity from an agent for vicarious liability.
Under this quasi-contractual theory of implied indemnity, a principal
who is liable solely on the basis of vicarious liability has a contractually based right to indemnification from the agent for any damages

53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 11-101 to 9-107 (1991), 745 ILCS 10/1-101 to /9-107 (1992).
54. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532. On a less noteworthy concern, the Burke
decision reaffirmed the court's adherence to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(1965) as it applies to the question of when multiple parties are joint or successive tortfeasors.
Id. at 438, 593 N.E.2d at 526.
55. 154 Ill. 2d 347, 609 N.E.2d 285 (1992).
56. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 70,

1

301-305 (1991), 740 ILCS 100/1-/5 (1992).

57. American, 154 Ill. 2d at 349, 609 N.E.2d at 286.
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caused by the agent's conduct. 8 The court also held that settlement
of a claim between plaintiff and the agent discharges the principal
for any vicarious liability for the plaintiff's injuries. Third, the court
stated that settlement of the claim between plaintiff and the principal
does not automatically extinguish the agent's liability to the plaintiff.
Thus, in the event of a settlement between plaintiff and principal,
the principal retains her action against the agent for indemnification. 9
B.

Venue

Where a plaintiff in contribution sues a government corporation,
venue is significantly affected by the rule which states that a government corporation must be sued in the county in which its principal
office is located. When read in conjunction with Laue v. Leifheit6
and forum non conveniens, venue may be controlled by the government corporation's principal office locale. In Cook v. General Electric
Co.,61 plaintiff, a resident of St. Clair County, was injured in a train
mishap while working in Montgomery County. Plaintiff filed suit in
St. Clair County against his employer and the manufacturer of the
train. One of the defendants filed a contribution action against
Montgomery County and the township in which the mishap occurred,
and moved to transfer the entire litigation to Montgomery County.
The defendant contended that under Section 2-103 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 62 the contribution action must be filed where the
county and township are located. Further, the defendant argued that
under Leifheit, actions for primary liability and contribution must
be decided by one jury. The trial court, however, severed and
transferred only the contribution claims to Montgomery County.
On review, the supreme court held that the trial court erred
when it severed the contribution claim and denied transfer of the
entire case. Although the court refused to cast its ruling in stone, its
opinion strongly suggests that actions involving contribution claims
against a government corporation should be litigated in the corporation's home county. First, the court reaffirmed the position taken
in Leifheit that one jury should determine both primary liability to
the plaintiff and contribution liability among co-tortfeasors. Based
solely on Leifheit, the court concluded that it was error to sever the
58. See Kenneth Kandaras & Patrick J. Kelley, New Developments in the Illinois Law of
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 407 (1992).
59. Id. at 447 n.272.
60. 105 Ill. 2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984).
61. 146 Il1. 2d 548, 588 N.E.2d 1087 (1992).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-103 (1991), 735 ILCS 5/2-103 (1992).
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contribution claims. Further, the court found no reason to create an
exception to the venue rule applicable to government corporations.
Although it noted that the rule may bend in instances in which
multiple corporations are sued, 6 the court found it unwise to permit
an exception to the venue rule simply based upon plaintiff's choice
of forum. Furthermore, it concluded that it was error to deny the
defendant's motion to transfer. Although plaintiff's choice of forum
is traditionally accorded considerable deference, and particularly so
when, as here, the action is filed in the plaintiff's county of residence,
the court concluded that the suit had a strong affiliation to Montgomery County, the county where plaintiff's employment relationship
was centered, where many witnesses were located, and where the
mishap occurred.
Despite the court's statement to the contrary, the Cook rule on
transfer may be all but written in stone. Although the court stated
that its decision should not be understood as permitting defendant
unilaterally to control venue by filing a contribution claim against a
government corporation, it is difficult to imagine another result in
actions where the mishap occurs in the contribution defendant's own
county. Ostensibly, Cook is not based solely upon the policy of
judicial economy found in Leifheit, nor the provisions of Section 2103. Rather, the court reasoned, these factors coupled with traditional
principles of forum non convoeniens compelled the result. Thus, the
court stated that Leifheit did not mandate a joint trial in every case,
and pointedly rejected the argument that Section 2-103 required a
transfer in every case. However, given the importance of the polices
underlying these rules and the significance attached in Cook to the
place of the mishap, litigants may be faced with the working rule
that actions will be transferred to the county in which the government
corporation/contribution defendant is located.
C.

Time for Filing

In Antunes v. Sookhakitch,6 the court reconciled conflicting
repose provisions dealing with medical malpractice actions and claims
brought on behalf of minors and non-minors. According to Section
212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 65 actions generally must be

63. See Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 108 Il1. App. 3d 191, 438 N.E.2d 1299
(1st Dist. 1982).
64. 146 Ill. 2d 477, 588 N.E.2d 1111 (1992).
65. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 212(a) (1991), 735 ILCS 5/2-212(a) (1992).
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filed within four years of the wrongful act. However, Section 212(b)
provides that actions on behalf of minors may be filed within eight
years. 66 The dilemma in Antunes resulted from the timely filing
within the eight year limit of a minor's action against a primary
defendant, followed by the filing beyond the four year limit (but
within the eight year period) of third party contribution actions
against co-tortfeasors. Importantly, all agreed that the minor's action
was timely. However, the third party defendants contended that the
four year repose period barred the contribution actions even though
the minor's suit was filed long after the four year period had run.
The court held that contribution actions may be filed within the
same repose period as that applicable to the plaintiff's action. It
based its holding upon its review of the laws and relevant legislative
history. From the history of the repose provisions, the court noted
that the intent of the rule was to "shorten the 'long tail' of medical
malpractice liability." ' 67 On this score, the court contended, the
defendants in contribution should have no quarrel because they
enjoyed no repose from the minor's potential claim against them.
Consequently, whether they were sued by the minor or the defendant
for contribution, they were still sued within their projected eight year
period of liability exposure. Further, the court reasoned, its holding
avoided what it considered a potentially absurd result, that being,
the dilemma in which the defendant's right to seek contribution
would already be time-barred at the time the plaintiff's original
action was filed. Such a potential result the court considered inequitable, and not one envisioned by the legislature.
XII.

HEALING ART MALPRACTICE: AFFIDAVIT &
REPORT

69
In DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth Hospital,68 and McAlister v. Schick,
the court rejected a series of constitutional challenges and held
constitutional the provisions of Section 2-622 of the Code of Civil
Procedure70 which require the plaintiff in a healing art malpractice
action to file the report of a health professional who attests to the
merit of the case and the affidavit of the attorney (or pro se plaintiff)

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
212(b), 735 ILCS 5/2-212(b).
Antunes, 146 I11.
2d at 492, 588 N.E.2d at 1118.
147 III. 2d 57, 588 N.E.2d 1139 (1992).
147 I11.
2d 84, 588 N.E.2d 1151 (1992).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-622 (1991), 735 ILCS 5/2-622 (1992).
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which states that the health professional believes the case is meritorious. The court noted that although the consequence of non-compliance with the rule is dismissal of the action, the statute did not
intrude on the judiciary's stated or inherent power to regulate judicial
procedures. Rather, the court found Section 2-622 a measured and
reasonable effort to eliminate frivolous suits and reduce litigation
costs. The court rejected arguments in turn that the provision violated
the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature,
that it unreasonably deprived plaintiff of access to a court, that it
denied plaintiff the equal protection of the law and due process of
law, and that it constituted impermissible special legislation under
the Illinois Constitution.
In Mizell v. Passo,7" the court held that the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to comply with Section 2-622 need not be
decided in advance of plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss the
action. The court repeated its oft-stated view from Gibellina v.
Handley72 that trial courts have the discretion to hear dispositive
motions that are filed before plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal. The court stressed that discretion could not be equated with
the compulsion to decide defendant's dispositive motion. 73 Finally,
the court found no abuse of discretion when the court granted
plaintiff's dismissal.
XIII.

LIMITATIONS OF CONSTRUCTION RELATED
ACTIONS

74

In Hernon v. E. W. Corrigan Construction Co., 7 the court
resolved the conflict between two statutes of limitations which both
purportedly covered tort actions arising from the construction or
management of real property. The plaintiff, a construction worker,
was injured when he fell from the roof at a construction site. More
than two years elapsed before he sued the defendant on theories of
negligence and Structural Work Act violations. The parties differed
as to the applicable limitation rules. The plaintiff argued that the
case fell within Section 13-214(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
71. 147 I11.2d 420, 590 N.E.2d 449 (1992).
72. 127 I11. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
73. See Bochantin v. Petroff, 145 Ill.2d 1, 582 N.E.2d 114 (1991) (Gibellina rule gives the
trial court discretion to hear previously filed dispositive motions in all but instances where the
motion is filed under ILL. SUP. CT. R. 103(b)).
74. See also Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 III. 2d 477, 588 N.E.2d 1111 (1992).
75. 149 II1. 2d 190, 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992).
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which specifically provides that tort actions relating to the construction or management of real property may be filed within four years
of the wrongful act. 7 6 Conversely, the defendant argued that Section
13-202 was applicable. 77 This provision is more general and provides
that actions "for an injury to the person" must be filed within two
years. 7 The court concluded that the legislature intended the more
narrowly focused provisions of Section 13-214 to control construction-related tort litigation and held the four year statute of limitations
applicable.
XIV.
A.

IMMUNITIES

Tort Immunity Act

1. Liability of Public Employee- "Execution or Enforcement" of
any Law
The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (TIA) 79 provides that public employees engaged in the
execution or enforcement of any law are liable for injuries caused
by their conduct only to the extent that their actions constitute willful
and wanton misconduct.8 0 In Aikens v. Morris,81 the court considered
the duties that fall within the term "execution or enforcement" of
the law. The plaintiff sued a police officer after the officer's car
struck and injured her. At the time of the mishap, the defendant
was transporting a prisoner from one place of confinement to another. He was not involved in chasing a suspect or any such emergency situation, but his activity was unquestionably within the officer's
official duties. The defendant argued that the TIA embraced the full
scope of his official duties, even the unexceptional duty of driving a
car used to transport a confined individual.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that the
TIA covered the range of a police officer's official duties. It limited

76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 13-214(a) (1991), 735 ILCS 5/15-214(a) (1992).
77. Id. 1 13-202, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.
78. Id.
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 11 1-101 to /10-101 (1991), 745 ILCS 10/1-101 to /10-101
(1992).
80. Section 2-202 applies to employees. Section 2-109, a parallel provision, precludes liability
against the municipal employer if the employee is not liable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 1 2-109,
745 ILCS 10/2-109.
81. 145 111.2d 273, 583 N.E.2d 487 (1991).
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the TIA to those activities in which the public employee's conduct
2
is "shaped or-affected" by the nature of the duties undertaken.1
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the protection of
the TIA should be coterminous with his duties. It reasoned that the
legislature intended the limitation to apply to only a narrow category
of highly fact-sensitive government functions. Thus, Aikens leaves
litigants with little direction concerning the conduct or duties that
fall within Section 2-202. Absent a working definition of the rule,
litigants are left to speculate about the circumstances to which the
rule applies. From the context of the opinion, it appears that it will
be limited to situations in which the government official may be
forced to act in ways that threaten damage to person or property.
Thus, the court offers-up its decision in Thompson v. City of
Chicago, 3 a case in which the police officer "moved his car forward
in an attempt to disperse an unruly crowd, '8 4 as a paradigm for the
rule. Extrapolating from Thompson, it appears that the rule will be
limited to situations in which the official should be given wide latitude
to make decisions in difficult circumstances.
2. Duty of Public Entity to Maintain Leased Property
In Vesey v. Chicago Housing Authority, 5 plaintiff sued for
injuries received by her minor child when he touched an uncovered
steam pipe located within a public housing apartment. The appellate
court, reversing summary judgement for the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), concluded that the TIA required the CHA to maintain
its property in a reasonably safe condition, even though the property
in question was rented to tenants and not in the CHA's control. The
appellate court based its ruling on Section 3-102 of the TIA which
provides that "a local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary
'8 6
care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the TIA did not alter
the common law rules affecting the liability of a landlord for demised
premises. The court repeated the rule:
[T]he Tort Immunity Act did not diminish or override the (traditional
principles) of landlord and tenant law. We believe that the general
duty of public entities set out in . . . the Tort Immunity Act must

Id. at 286, 583 N.E.2d at 494.
108 III. 2d 429, 484 N.E.2d 1086 (1985).
Aikens, 145 I11.2d at 279, 583 N.E.2d at 490.
145 Ill. 2d 404, 583 N.E.2d 538 (1991).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 3-102, 745 ILCS 10/3-102.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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be read in conjunction with the common law principles that 'where

a defective condition exists on premises leased to a tenant and under
the tenant's control,
a landlord is not liable for injuries cause by
87
their condition.'

Consequently, the CHA's liability for demised premises was no
greater than that of a private landowner. 8
3.

Traffic Control Devices
In West v. Kirkham, 8 9 the court held that under the TIA a

municipality is not liable for injuries allegedly caused by its failure
to provide traffic control devices. In West, the plaintiff was injured
when her car collided with another as she made a left turn through
an intersection. Plaintiff contended that the city was negligent in not

installing a left turn arrow to control her lane of traffic and that
her claim fell beyond the general rule that exempts municipalities
from liability for failure to provide regulatory devices. 90 Plaintiff

contended that the city knew that the intersection was dangerous
without the left turn arrow, that the city had voluntarily undertaken

to install the arrow when it installed such a device for traffic in the
opposite lane, and that the city had an overarching duty under

Section 3-102(a) to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. The court rejected these arguments holding that the TIA
specifically exempts municipalities from liability for its failure to
install traffic control devices. 91
B.

School Code: In Loco Parentis

School districts are not entitled under the School Code92 to assert
the defense of in loco parentis in actions which contend that the
87. Vesey, 145 I11.2d at 414, 583 N.E.2d at 542-43 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 13102, 745 ILCS 10/3-102).
88. The court also considered the plaintiff's contention that the CHA had voluntarily
undertaken the duty to provide and replace protective covers for the steam pipes and was
negligent in its failure to properly install the cover and its failure to replace an adequate one.
The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any facts that supported a claim of
negligence in the installation of the initial cover, ,or the tenant's reliance upon the CHA to
repair the inadequate cover. Vessey, 145 I11.2d at 417-18, 583 N.E.2d at 544-45.
89. 147 Ill. 2d 1, 588 N.E.2d 1104 (1992).
90. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
3-104, 74 ILCS 10/3-104 (no liability for "failure to
initially provide regulatory traffic control devices").
91. The court discounted plaintiff's theory that, because the city's actions concerning the
intersection amounted to "the adoption of a plan or design" to improve public property under
Section 3-103(a), the city was liable under that rule. West, 147 Ill. 2d at 7, 588 N.E.2d at
1107.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
1-1 to 35-31 (1991), 105 ILCS 5/1-1 to /35-31 (1992).
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school district, and not an educator, negligently injured a student.
In Sidwell v. Groggsville Community School District,93 the court held
that the School Code which "confers upon educators the status of
parent or guardian" does not apply to actions alleging that the school
district, as opposed to its educational employees, has committed
negligence. Further, over Justice Heiple's dissent, the court refused
to consider whether the TIA, a matter not raised below, might apply
to such an action. Thus, the court rejected the notion of an in loco
parentis defense for the school district but left for further consideration the question of whether the TIA might restrict recovery to
proof of willful and wanton misconduct.

93. 146 IMl.2d 467, 588 N.E.2d 1185 (1992).
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